From Rolling Thunder to Reggae: Imagining Squatter Settlements in Papua New Guinea by Goddard, Michael
Early in the morning of 4 February 1998 police raided the old, aban-
doned parliament building in downtown Port Moresby, Papua New Gui-
nea. Adjacent to the central business district, where high-rise buildings had
mushroomed during the decade, the dilapidated building had in recent
years been the subject of calls for preservation as a national monument.
Its exterior was crumbling and overgrown with weeds, its interior long
since looted of anything indicative of its former dignity. It had become the
habitat of squatters, whose presence had provoked complaints from the
downtown business community for some time. Now, suddenly, they were
evicted, in an operation the police had code-named “Enough Is Enough,”
though it was never made clear who gave the order. Senior staff at the
National Museum, who had been prominent advocates of the building’s
preservation, denied rumors that they were behind the eviction (PC, 4, 5
Feb 1998).
A few days previously the police had raided the Baruni dump, a ru b b i s h
tip on the “back road” that connected Port Moresby’s northwest suburbs
to the downtown area circuitously thro u g h a relatively uninhabited stre t c h
of land to the coast west of the city. The “back road” (officially known
as Baruni Road; map 1) has long had a reputation for armed holdups and
the perpetrators in recent times were popularly said to come from the
ranks of the squatters at the dump, who scoured their habitat constantly
for materials to build shelters, sell at the roadside, or turn to other subsis-
tence purposes. The police found some stolen vehicles hidden behind the
dump, and while the raid on the dump community itself disclosed no
stolen property, the stolen vehicles were used as justification for the evic-
tion of the dump squatters and the torching of their makeshift shelters in
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the planned operation the police had code-named “Rolling Thunder”
(PC, 30 Jan, 6 Feb 1998).
Both raids were conducted in the climate of calls for a solution to the
problem of “squatters” and “settlements” in general, and debate over
proposals for the reintroduction of a Vagrancy Act similar to that which
had existed during the colonial period (National, 13, 19 Feb 1998; PC, 16,
19 Feb 1998). The “settlement” issue has waxed and waned several times
in the past two decades in an ongoing debate on what to do about unem-
ployment and crime, which are causally linked in popular discourse. In
the mid 1990s its intensity seemed to have heightened, and for the first
time was reflected in a noticeable rise in practical action against urban
settlements and squatters by police and provincial authorities around the
country. Local authorities ordered mass evictions of selected settlements
in Rabaul and Lae late in 1994, for example, and while police were evict-
ing the Baruni-dump and old-parliament-building squatters the Madang
Provincial Government was preparing to bulldoze a large and long-estab-
lished settlement whose existence was hampering the development of busi-
ness premises in the provincial capital.
Evictions such as these have been a common occurrence in third-world
towns and cities since mass urban migration and the connected phenom-
ena of squatters and shantytowns became an issue, and state responses on
several continents have moved more or less cyclically through attempts
to discourage migrants to attempts to upgrade existing settlements and
plan self-help or low-cost housing areas (see, eg, Drakakis-Smith 1981,
113–167; 1990, 99–109; Dwyer 1979; Gilbert 1986; Gilbert and Gugler
1987, 97–107). As uncontrolled settlements continue to appear and grow,
responses have sometimes included intimidation to the point of violence
(see, eg, Scheper-Hughes 1992). Common popular perceptions of squat-
ter settlements and shantytowns link themes of uncontrolled migration,
unemployment, extreme poverty, and crime, characterizing settlement
populations as maladjusted and undesirable in urban society. The atti-
tudes reflected in the responses of the Papua New Guinean state, through
police, the media, and local authorities, resonate with those observed, for
instance, in Asia (Dwyer 1979, 45) and Latin America (Drakakis-Smith
1981, 83–84; Scheper-Hughes 1992). The comment by Nancy Scheper-
Hughes, writing of a Brazilian shantytown, that impoverished rural
migrants are “seen as a kind of modern-day plague, an unruly cancerous
growth, an infectious epidemic inflicted on the once healthy and sound
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social body of the community” could be extended to third-world cities in
general, as could her perception of “a hegemonic discourse on criminal-
ity/deviance /marginality and on the ‘appropriateness’ of police and state
violence in which all segments of the population participate and to which
they acquiesce, often contrary to their own class or race interests”
(Scheper-Hughes 1992, 94, 225). 
Yet some paradoxes emerged during and after the Baruni-dump and
old-parliament-building evictions, suggesting that stereotypic models of
the squatter phenomenon and state responses cannot be visited on Papua
New Guinea without qualification. After being evicted with great fanfare
by armed police and ferried to a nearby police station, the parliament-
building squatters were within a few hours allowed to drift back to the
vicinity of the building. As they milled in the street the prime minister of
the time, Bill Skate, arrived and distributed food and drinks, promising
to look into their plight (National, 4 Feb 1998). The following day they
were offered payment to assist museum staff clean the building (PC, 5, 10
Feb 1998). No such pleasantries were offered the Baruni-dump squatters,
but by midyear they had moved back onto the dump, and the Salvation
Army was publicizing its weekly visits to them to distribute food and
drinks (PC, 15 July 1998). No move was made to re-evict them. Later in
the year a video clip accompanying “Born to Suffer,” a reggae song about
poverty and hunger in resource-rich Papua New Guinea by a local band
called Bad Mix Souls, showed the squatters scavenging at the dump.
There is little doubt that the increased demands for action on “settle-
ments” had been fueled by the concerns of the business community about
the detrimental effects of crime and images of urban squalor on economic
development and attempts to attract overseas interest and investment. The
Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce publicly applauded the old-parlia-
ment-building eviction and commented that local businesses “could now
look forward to some respite from unruly elements” (PC, 5 Feb 1998).
Arguably, though, the discursive linking of settlements, unemployment,
and crime, a theme popular with politicians, police spokespeople, and the
business community and monotonously repeated in the daily press, is in
need of critique. The popular notion that settlements are criminogenic, by
virtue of a population said to be largely unemployed and pauperized, is
reinforced by the frequency of police raids, some of which are well-pub-
licized in the local press as components of “crackdowns” on crime (usu-
ally with well-broadcast operation “code names”) and contextualized in
a rhetoric about inevitable consequences of urban migration and poverty.
Inventories of stolen goods found and people arrested (if at all) in the
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police raids are usually vague, however, compared to the accounts of the
raids themselves.
Events in the aftermath of the Baruni-dump raid cast some equivocal-
ity on civil authorities’ vilification of squatters and urban settlers. In the
weeks following the eviction of the dump squatters, intermittent armed
holdups continued to occur on the back road (eg, PC, 3 March 1998).
After a police stakeout a gang was finally caught (PC, 26 April 1998). It
had been using the area behind the dump as a gathering point and hid-
ing-place for stolen vehicles, members then dispersing to their homes in
other suburbs. It can be assumed that the dump squatters knew about the
gang’s operations but had been intimidated or bribed into silence. The use
of particular settlements as operational gathering and dispersal points is
common among urban gangs, exploiting the criminal imagery of settle-
ments to misdirect the immediate vengeance of their pursuers and victims.
The origin and resilience of this generalized imagery of settlements is the
main subject of the discussion that follows, which situates it in the par-
ticular context of late colonialism in Papua New Guinea and subsequent
urban developments when the country gained political independence.
While the growth of settlements and responses of authorities in Papua
New Guinea share some commonalities with other third-world countries
t h e re are also important diff e rences, and a consideration of these may con-
tribute to an understanding of the paradoxes manifest in the conciliatory
gestures to the old-parliament-building squatters by the prime minister
and museum staff and the permitted return of the Baruni-dump squatters.
Concentrating mostly on Port Moresby, the capital city, I begin with a
review of the development of urban housing from immediately after the
Second World War, when significant urban migration began, through
Papua New Guinea’s transition in the mid 197 0s from a colony to an inde-
pendent nation. This will contextualize the development of the deroga-
tory imagery of “squatter settlements” in European discourse in the late
colonial era, and I subsequently discuss the perpetuation of this imagery
to the present time and its relationship to episodes like “Rolling Thun-
der” and “Enough Is Enough.”
Housing after the Second World Wa r
With the easing of restrictions on the movement of indigenes into urban
areas in the aftermath of the Second World War, migrants began to trickle
steadily into Port Moresby. The colonial administration had no general
long-term program for housing the newcomers, in what had become in
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many respects an Australian small town (Oram 1976a, 41). Before the
w a r, indigenous workers re c ruited from beyond the immediate villages had
been accommodated in barrack and dormitory conditions. In that period
the only habitats in Port Moresby not fully controlled by European inter-
ests were the local villages of the Motu people, the traditional coastal
inhabitants of the area who had intermarried to a degree with the Koita
who lived inland. A few of the early postwar migrants from other areas
managed to establish themselves in these villages, on the basis of old trad-
ing relationships and sometimes through intermarriage with the Motu-
Koita. Apart from this, migrant housing in the decade following the war
was principally of three types: workers’ “compounds” established by
government departments and companies such as the traders Burns Philp,
Carpenters, and Steamships; domestic quarters attached to European res-
idences (commonly referred to by Europeans in kitchen pidgin as “boy
houses”); and so-called settlements.
The establishment of the first postwar settlements was achieved not by
illicit squatting but by arrangement with local traditional landowners, as
in the well-documented case of Rabia Camp at Kaugere (Hitchcock and
Oram 1967), and occasionally with town authorities (eg, Norwood 1984).
The distinction between these two types of liaison was less clear in prac-
tice than on paper, since the Motu-Koita re g a rded the Port Moresby urban
area as essentially their land, despite some areas having been acquired by
the administration through early transactions that it classified as pur-
chase. For example, a downtown settlement, Ranuguri, which is partly
on government land and partly on customary land, began when migrants
from the Gulf District were invited to move into buildings vacated by the
army at the end of the war. According to some commentators (eg, Rew
1974, 6; Ryan 1970, 19) the arrangement was intended as a temporary
measure by the administration while it built proper housing for employ-
ees. Although this suggests that the administration itself told the settlers
to move into the buildings, there is equivocation among the settlers over
who issued the invitation. For instance, I was told by a long-term settler
that his kin had been invited by the customary landowners to take over
the buildings. This interpretation, which ignores official classification of
the piece of ground on which the buildings stood as government land, is
predicated on the old trading relationships between Motu and Gulf peo-
ple, and on the established Motu practice of inviting individuals from
their trading-partner groups to settle on their land.
The settlements grew in size and number as the firstcomers were joined
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by near and distant kin from their places of origin. Their growth caused
c o n c e rn both to traditional landholders (Ryan 196 8, 61) and to the admin-
istration. For the Motu-Koita landholders it became increasingly diff i c u l t
to collect the rent-in-kind or continue the personal exchange re l a t i o n s h i p s
that had been integral to the negotiations with the first small groups of set-
tlers (Levine and Levine 197 9, 1 8). The administration feared the pro s p e c t
of overcrowding and the gradual transformation of small but tidy groups
of makeshift houses into large and unruly conglomerates. When the set-
tlements first appeared they were tolerated by the administration because
they provided a solution to the problem of housing workers during post-
war reconstruction. But after a few years officials became fearful that a
migrant underclass would develop. Some settlements were at one point
denied water supplies and garbage and sanitary services in an attempt to
discourage the migrants, according to Ryan (1993, 222), or to remove the
settlers from land re q u i red for other purposes, according to Oram (197 6a ,
196). Other strategies, such as plans by a Housing Commission (estab-
lished in 1968) to resettle the occupants in better organized cheap hous-
ing estates, came only to partial fruition (Oram 1976a, 191ff ).
By the 1970s the administration had accepted the inevitable presence
of settlements (Oram 1976a, 185–205; Stuart 1970, 288–290) and had
moved from attempts to discourage them to various assistance schemes,
a transition that mirrored similar changes in government policies else-
where in the third world (see, eg, Dwyer 1979, 78–117, 188–227; Dra-
kakis-Smith 1990, 99–109; Gilbert 1986). In 1973 the flow of people into
town was beyond the capacity of the Housing Commission’s resettlement
scheme, and new self-help policies were introduced (Bryant 1977; Rabuni
and Norwood 198 0). Some existing settlements were provided with paved
footpaths and basic services like water taps, and blocks of land were allo-
cated on selected sites around the town on which people could build their
own shelter (theoretically in accordance with building regulations). The
scheme was elaborated to include financial loans to enable tenants to
build adequate housing for themselves. One product of the combination
of the Housing Commission’s resettlement plan and the self-help policies
was the development of Morata suburb on the edge of the Port Moresby
town area, a planned operation that began in 1971 and involved both
rental and self-help housing (Bryant 1977). In addition community wel-
fare groups attempted to assist particular settlement populations in their
efforts to get basic services such as water supplies and to develop hand-
crafts and other income-generating activities (see, eg, Mylius 1971).
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In retrospect, the attempts by the colonial administration to deal with
the continual arrival of migrants through the development of a variety of
habitats in the late colonial period, documented by Oram (1976a, 167–
208), can be seen as a process of piecemeal reaction, rather than system-
atic planning. As Oram has pointed out, the distribution of housing areas
in Port Moresby by the end of the colonial period did not conform to any
recognizable spatial theory (1976a, 100). There were “high-covenant”
housing areas almost exclusively occupied by Europeans, low-coven a n t
planned estates such as the “partially integrated” (Stuart 1970, 307) sub-
urb of Hohola with a few Europeans but mostly housing Papua New Gui-
neans, cheaper rental housing, self-help (“no-covenant”) housing areas,
the original settlements, company compounds, and domestic quarters.
While some cheap indigenous housing areas established by the adminis-
tration were deliberately sited away from high-covenant European resi-
dential areas (Oram 1976a, 101) they were not hidden, but lined major
roads and were not far distant from European housing, while some work-
ers’ compounds and all domestic quarters were integrated into European-
dominated areas.
The difference between high-covenant housing for Europeans and low-
covenant and other types of housing for Papua New Guineans in the late
colonial era is conventionally related in literature to other racially segre-
gatory practices of the period (eg, Hastings 1973, 99ff; Kiki 1966, 72;
Ward 1970, 60; Wolfers 1975, 119, 154ff). But, importantly, the variety
of indigenous urban housing itself engendered another type of distinction.
There was a perceptual dichotomization by Europeans of migrant Papua
New Guinean urban habitats, based on a concatenation of the spatial
relationship between European and indigenous housing and the degree of
orderliness of the latter. The low-covenant houses, company compounds,
and domestic quarters were reasonably tidy in appearance, and their com-
parative physical proximity to European housing implied the relative
social proximity of their inhabitants, as workmates, subordinates, or
domestic servants. This was not necessarily manifest in friendly relations;
discriminatory attitudes and cultural misunderstanding were common
(Nelson 1972, 168–172; Wolfers 1975, 152ff ) and regular occupational
contact and interaction did not guarantee friendly socializing outside
working hours. But the image of social proximity, however limited, was
in contrast with that engendered for Europeans by the migrant settle-
ments on customary and government land and the self-help housing are a s ,
a little more removed from the elite European housing estates and rare l y
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e n t e red by whites. The initial small settlements that appeared in the imme-
diate postwar period had been neatly laid out (Oram 1976a, 185), but
took on an increasingly untidy appearance as they grew. Similarly, in the
self-help housing areas an unruly impression was created by the impro-
vised nature of houses, made from whatever material settlers could obtain,
and the asymmetrical clusters on land blocks originally planned by sur-
veyors. A social researcher of the period, who bemoaned the “appalling
symmetry” of the rows of neat low-covenant houses and preferred the
creative approach of self-help housing areas, conceded that “To Euro-
pean eyes the results may not be as aesthetically pleasing as are the ser-
ried ranks of little boxes” (Wa rd 197 0, 6 0; cf, Levine and Levine 197 9, 4) .
Literature on third-world settlements, and slums in general, commonly
makes the point that such habitats are unfairly judged by outsiders on
their untidy appearance (eg, Drakakis-Smith 1981, 88ff; Gilbert and
Gugler 1987, 128). The aesthetic judgment of settlements in urban Papua
New Guinea was not made in a simple comparison with European hous-
ing styles or architecture, however, but was contextualized in a dualism
of European style and an idealized “traditional” rural village. In this
respect settlements and architecturally changing urban villages were both
seen as aesthetically deviant. In a discussion of the growth of Lae, a city
at the mouth of the Bumbu River on Papua New Guinea’s northeastern
coast, Willis commented on the five “traditional” villages immediately
across the river mouth:
Despite their proximity to the city they have not yet been assimilated into it
and are still a separate entity. The village houses, often built from reclaimed
scraps of timber, iron and fibro-cement, seem dilapidated even by comparison
with the houses in the adjacent “squatter” camps. They stand in strong con-
trast to the neat bungalows of the city and to the other traditional villages to
east and west where houses are still built of native materials and have a neat,
post-card picturesqueness. (Willis 1974, 145; italics mine)
Under the labels “settlements” or “squatter settlements” or sometimes
“shantytowns” (a term that has now almost disappeared) the customary
and government land settlements and the no-covenant housing areas were
discursively collapsed together, reinforcing the image of a socially distant
population. The connection of a spatial and aesthetic dichotomy of urban
indigenous habitats with a relative degree of social distance of their
inhabitants from the economically dominant white population was
reflected in journalistic literature of the period. For example Peter Hast-
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ings wrote in 196 9 of an “urban proletariat, unskilled, living on the bre a d-
line in shanties erected in increasing numbers on the bare brown hills of
that disagreeable town. . . . a polyglot force of men without jobs, women
or land—the dispossessed of the new dispensation” (197 3, 9 0). Osmar
White in 197 2 similarly sequestered in print those migrants to Port
M o resby who “set up squalid shantytowns on its perimeters, subsisting as
best they could on wages for casual, unskilled labour” (197 2, 2 00–2 0 1) .1
Sociological re s e a rch did not support this image. Richard Jackson com-
mented that while there might be a “grain of truth” in the view of settle-
ments as repositories of ill-adjusted transients, “a strong case can be made
in support of the opposite view: that the settlements are frequently the
homes of people less transitory, no more unemployed and just as urban-
ized as other sectors of the population” (197 6, 4 9). A survey in another
town, Popondetta, had shown that nearly two-thirds of the administra-
t i o n ’s laborers and many tradesmen lived in settlements (Jackson 197 6,
4 9), as did “business managers, teachers, and two members of the national
Parliament” (Jackson 1977, 32). An examination of the Six Mile settle-
ment in Port Moresby in the 1970s indicated that about 70 percent of the
adults were employed (Levine and Levine 1979, 37) and in a sample of
settlements in several urban centers it was found that households (largely
built around nuclear families) contained an average of between one and
two wage earners (Jackson 197 7, 3 2; Levine and Levine 197 9, 4 2). In this
respect Papua New Guinea’s settlement dwellers were socioeconomically
similar to those in many other third-world settlement and slum commu-
nities (see Drakakis-Smith 1990, 94–99; Dwyer 1979, 45–49; Gilbert and
Gugler 1987, 88–89; Roberts 1982, 376). Yet the image of dispossessed
squatters in settlements, contrasting with a more socially proximate work-
ing urban indigenous population in other types of housing, prevailed in
popular European discourse. Although this simple dichotomy misrepre-
sented the complex demography of Port Moresby,2 it became institution-
alized discursively, and has survived the colonial period and an ongoing
process of change in the nature and variety of habitats in Port Moresby.
In the 1960s some settlers who could more justifiably be called squat-
ters were appearing in Port More s b y. The earlier settlements were enclaves
of people sharing a region of origin, such as the Eastern Gulf people at
Ranuguri settlement, or Purari people at Rabia camp. Later migrants fro m
other areas, particularly the highlands, were naturally excluded from
building houses in these existing micro-ethnic enclaves. Lacking tradi-
tional exchange links with Motu-Koita landholders, or the wherewithal to
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obtain no-covenant land blocks from the administration, those who were
unable to negotiate some kind of arrangement with customary landhold-
ers were often obliged to find a niche on unused government land. An
example is Gordons Ridge settlement where migrants from the Simbu and
Goilala districts developed discrete groups of shelters on a hill overlook-
ing one of the most exclusive European housing estates. Their appearance
caused concern among the Europeans below, and many of the migrants
were persuaded to resettle at Morata, the newly developed suburb con-
taining a mixture of low-covenant and no-covenant housing. However,
some squatters remained, and the Gordons Ridge settlement gradually
developed, with the inhabitants improving their dwellings, planting trees,
and building an access road (Norwood 1984, 34). Their habitat was con-
solidated and gained legitimacy, if not absolute legality, as it grew in the
1980s.
By the 1970s a broad range of housing, from unauthorized buildings
on government land, through various types of customary or administra-
tion-authorized dwellings on unused land, to planned self-help housing
on leased blocks, was being referred to in common European discourse
as “the settlements” or “squatter settlements.” The broad and indiscrim-
inate use of such terms, together with the difficulty of precisely catego-
rizing the variety of indigenous housing that had developed in Port
Moresby, may have been responsible for the disparity in academic litera-
ture of the period (among empirically careful researchers) in representa-
tions of the numbers of “settlements” in existence at different points in
time from the 195 0s until the 197 0s .3 In the face of ongoing changes in the
n a t u re of the town’s habitats, the institutionalized notion of settlements
(incorporating the notion of squatters), proved resilient in the following
y e a r s .
Housing after Independence
When Papua New Guinea became an independent nation in 1975, and the
European population began to dwindle, the housing areas it had inhab-
ited were taken over by indigenes. This substitution, in combination with
ongoing housing projects, increasing urban migration, and the demands of
the extended kin systems typical of Melanesian societies, began to change
the spatial distinction between the housing types discussed earlier, with-
out significantly altering the institutionalized notion of a dichotomy of
“settlements” and formal (ie, low- and high-covenant) housing. Building
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projects were extending some of the formal housing estates in the outer
suburbs to the point where they began to connect with self-help housing
areas, which had originally been discrete, and with enclaves of squatters
who had established themselves quietly at the periphery of the urban area
since the 1960s. At the same time the inhabitants of these peripheral areas
were building extensions to, or upgrading, their houses if they were able.
Consequently, while some settlements remained demarcated by boundary
fencing, the overall visual and spatial distinction between squatter settle-
ments, legitimate settlements, and planned low-cost housing estates
became less clear in some outer suburbs. In addition, the untidy develop-
ment of suburbs with basic infrastructure provided the opportunity for
individuals or families to establish illicit dwellings in the interstices of
growing communities of migrants from a variety of ethnic backgrounds,
w h e re few questions of legitimacy were asked unless serious trouble aro s e .
In this respect, for example, parts of the formerly European-dominated
suburb of Boroko and of the low-covenant suburb of Hohola now have
a mixt u re of housing types significantly diff e rent from what existed in the
early 1970s.
A further change after independence was that the homologic re l a t i o n-
ship between two- or thre e - b e d roomed housing and European nuclear
families was displaced under Melanesian kinship sensibilities. The exigen-
cies of an unavoidable obligation to provide assistance to members of
o n e ’s extended kingro up—re f e rred to with ambivalent sentiments as the
“wantok system” by urban Papua New Guineans (wantok is a To k p i s i n
t e rm used to refer to kin, both near and distant)—meant that the urban
house became a locus of the nominal occupants’ kindred. It has been
a rgued by Keith Barber that it is analytically useful to re g a rd urban Papua
New Guinean households not as physical units of co-residence but more
flexibly as sets of changing social relations, acknowledging the social con-
text in which they are embedded (1993, 26–2 7). This perspective avoids
positing households as fixed sets of people, and more accurately re f l e c t s
the change in the nature of householding when European residents were
replaced by indigenes. Household numbers fluctuated with the movement
of relatives both from home areas into town and back, and among w a n-
toks’ residences in town. This did not escalate into major overc rowding of
individual houses however,4 although domestic quarters attached to high-
covenant houses were now often used as accommodation for migrant kin.
An associated phenomenon was a new kind of squatter, the “illegal”
occupant of formal housing. As industry grew in Papua New Guinea’s
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towns, large-scale employers rented houses, or blocks of houses, for
employees. “Compounds” now included all types of housing, up to rela-
tively luxurious dwellings for the new Papua New Guinean elite as well as
for highly paid foreigners. Where colonial employers had enforced the
expulsion and exclusion of illicit occupants of compound and rental hous-
ing (mostly the wantoks of employees) relatively eff i c i e n t l y, Melanesian
sensibilities made the task far more difficult for indigenous bosses, even
though the policy of evicting such occupants remained. For example,
when I lived in the large housing compound of the University of Papua
New Guinea in the early 1990s, constant complaints were made by legit-
imate inhabitants and those employees waiting to be allocated housing
about the number of squatters occupying dwellings of various kinds.
These were often relatives of employees who had gained access to houses
through their kinship connections, and sometimes were ex-employees of
the university who had simply failed to move out. Despite the occasional
flurry of memoranda and threats of forcible eviction, there was little real
action against them. Administrative staff (including some who were com-
plainants) were constrained as a body by the dense kinship networks
under which the squatters had established themselves in the first place.
Developments such as these indicated an ongoing housing problem in
the capital city, which was a legacy of the colonial administration’s slow
response to postwar urban migration, an absence of adequate long-term
town-planning, and a lack of affordable housing for non-elite workers.
By the late 198 0s a new belt of self-help settlements, on leased land blocks,
was beginning to establish itself at a few kilometers’ remove from the
expanding city’s edge in an area where there had previously been only one
or two small settlements containing single micro-ethnic groups (see, eg,
Vele 197 8). As well as serving recent migrants from rural areas, these habi-
tats were the recourse of former city dwellers seeking refuge from the
financial problems of living in town and the increasing limitations on per-
sonal freedoms presented by Port More s b y ’s growth. Moving to locations
such as Eight Mile5 was a strategy to avoid the city’s “l a w - a n d - o rd er”
p roblems, obtain access to gardening land, yet remain close enough to
take advantage of employment opportunities in town (Barber 1998). 
In contemporary Port Moresby, although most settlements established
during the late colonial period still exist, and illicit housing is still built
by squatters, the distinction between different types of urban habitat and
the associated socioeconomic status of inhabitants is even less clear than
it was by the early 1970s. Squatters can be found in many types of hous-
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ing, from high-covenant to illicit lean-to shelters, and while some self-help
areas have boundary fencing, there is no clear spatial separation overall
between various types of urban “settlements” and other types of housing.
Despite the increasing complexity in the mixture of housing in the con-
temporary city, the discursive dichotomization of its habitats into legiti-
mate housing and “settlements” has survived from colonial times. I now
turn to this dichotomy, and the attendant imagery that links migrants,
unemployment, and crime to a particular type of urban habitat, and
examine its resilience in the face of empirical change.
The Resilient Imag e ry of Settlements
The generalized European imagery of settlements in the late colonial
period was of a spatially separate and disorderly collection of habitats
implying the social distance of the people who occupied them, as I have
shown. The dichotomizing imagery itself was engendered by the domi-
nant ideology of the colonizers that posited Melanesian societies as essen-
tially rural, traditional, and primitive in contrast to urbanizing, modern,
and civilized western societies. In European-dominated urban settings the
orderliness of habitats—that is, the degree to which they fitted with the
overall physical appearance of a range of housing modeled on that of a
subtropical Australian small town—served as one putative measure of the
degree of civilization attained by indigenes. The rural-urban dualism itself
was also a taken-for-granted component of the body of modernization
theories that informed western approaches to decolonization in the 1960s
and 1970s, whereby an earlier resource extraction program and “civiliz-
ing” mission were recast as a “development” program. In the era of
decolonization, development programs were aimed at enabling what was
presumed to be an inevitable but problematic evolutionary transition
from the “traditional” to the “modern” that could be theorized in terms
of the sociological, psychological, and economic progress of the general
population (Larrain 1989, 87–98). As Jorge Larrain has pointed out
(1989, 87), terminological substitutions like “rural” and “backward,” or
“urban” and “developed” can be made in respect of the two ideal soci-
ety types posited in the modernization model, the “traditional” and the
“modern.”
In Papua New Guinea the colonial administration had carefully con-
t rolled the movement from rural “traditional” society to urban “modern ”
society before the Second World Wa r. After the war, modernization was
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expected to involve a long and difficult process of broad education. In a
195 0 policy statement, Australian Minister for External Te rritories P C
Spender said of the prospect of the “advancement” of Papua New Gui-
neans, “This will take a very long time but the natives have shown that
with the proper guidance and given the opportunity they have the capac-
ity to carry out both manual and mental tasks in accordance with our con-
cepts” (Spender, cited in Jinks, Biskup, and Nelson 197 3, 3 40–3 4 1). The
traditional image of Melanesians, and its problematic nature for the mod-
ernization programs of Europeans, was implicit in diplomatic references
to “native” customs, such as Spender’s assurance (in the same policy state-
ment) that in education and technical training activities “care is taken to
preserve the structure of native tribal life and native customs that are not
harmful or repugnant to humanity.” It was more explicit in assessments
like that of Assistant Administrator J T Gunther in 1958: “Their houses
are crudely built and uncomfortable; they have next to no furniture of the
kind that gives us some comfort in our living, their cooking methods are
c rude, their eating utensils practically nil. C o m p a red with ours, their farm-
ing methods are almost non-existent” (1958, 57). In commonsense Euro-
pean perceptions, the urban environment was the appropriate habitat of
the modernizing, rather than the traditional, Papua New Guinean: “It is
the cities, not the villages, which are the centres of civilization, culture,
commerce, industry and education in any country. It is in them that new
ideas are encountered, new knowledge acquired, new skills learned, new
relationships established and new wealth exchanged. A country without
cities is doomed to stagnation and backwardness” (Stuart 1970, 289).
In the light of the view that the “advancement” of the majority of Papua
New Guineans, seen as traditional villagers, was going to involve a long
process of training, uncontrollable urban migration following the Second
World War signaled a pathological situation for the colonizers—the pre-
mature arrival of the primitive into the modern environment. The con-
cept of the “squatter settlement,” the disjunctive urban habitat, neatly
encapsulated this impetuous engagement of the ill-prepared primitive
with civilization. Whatever reason was attributed by observers to the
migration of villagers—the attraction of the bright lights, the need for a
cash income, the avoidance of village social responsibilities, the drudgery
of traditional life or its breakdown (cf, Levine and Levine 1979, 28–32;
Clunies Ross 1984, 5–10)—the consequences were assumed to be the
same. The migrants arrived in town without funds, jobs, modern work
skills, or proper accommodation. Institutionalized in a homogenizing
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colonial discourse, the terms settlements and squatter settlements (used
interchangeably) had come by the mid 1970s to imply habitats peopled
by unemployed migrants living in poverty and various degrees of squalor,
socially distant from more legitimate urban dwellers, and inclined to crim-
inal activity. Used in this way the terms demonstrate some of the qualities
Victor Turner attributed to emotionally forceful symbols: a number of
meanings (“poverty,” “unemployment,” “crime,” etc) are condensed into
a single symbolic form (“settlements”), and the term permits therefore an
“economy of reference” (Turner 1972, 29). 
H o w e v e r, the meanings condensed into the term settlements derived not
so much from the immediate urban reality of the later colonial period as
from the collective popular imagination of Europeans. For instance, the
imagery of journalists such as Hastings (1973) and White (1972) did not
accord with the sociological findings of Jackson (1976) and others on the
socioeconomic status of settlement dwellers overall. The imagined crim-
inogenic nature of settlements (linked to the assumption that settlement
dwellers were mostly unemployed) was no better supported by empirical
investigation. Social researchers in the late colonial era reported that
criminal gangs of the era included both employed and unemployed peo-
ple (Po‘o 1975; Utulurea 1981), and that economic deprivation was not a
key factor (Young 1976). As late as 1983, an officially commissioned
review of crime, law, and order, drawing on recent research findings,
stated that “on the face of it institutional housing compounds, urban vil-
lages and migrant settlements have low arrest rates,” that “formally sub-
divided suburbs have high arrest rates,” that “it has never been shown
that migrants in urban settlements are more criminally inclined than the
rest of the comunity,” and that “low crime rates are known to exist in
c e rtain urban ethnic groups, or settlements” (d pa 1983, 1 6 1–1 6 3). Yet the
ideology of inevitable pathology in urbanization—unemployed migrants
living in squalid housing turning to crime—was impervious to empirical
research. An urban geographer lamented “The ‘squatters’ are caricatured
as unemployed and lawless, and their settlements as disease-ridden com-
munities of ill-adapted drifters, unnecessary blots on the national escutch-
eon” (Jackson 1977, 27). 
Indigenous urban dwellers of the late colonial period had diff e rent pre j-
udices. There was resentment at the general segregation, including hous-
ing policies, practiced by Europeans. A prominent indigenous political fig-
u re, Albert Maori Kiki, expressed this polemically: “We are put in
settlements such as Hohola and Kaugere, away from white people. Our
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settlements are places for the white man’s sexual outlet” (1966, 72).
Hohola was actually a low-covenant housing area; Kiki conflated low-
covenant and settlement housing in his statement. His use of the term set-
tlements was thus not a simple reproduction of European popular usage
but, importantly, an appropriation to an indigenous viewpoint connoting
socially segregated, rather than informal, housing, a point I re t u rn to later.
There were also issues of resentment between indigenous groups. In Port
Moresby, Motu-Koita concerns at the growth of settlements after the Sec-
ond World War were subsumed under their general concern at the growth
of the colonial town on their traditional land.6 As most of the earlier
postwar settlers had been Papuan and historically familiar by virtue of
old trading relations, potential hostility toward their increasing numbers
was displaced by a shared antagonism toward a newer problem. Grow-
ing numbers of migrants were arriving from the highlands and coastal
New Guinea7 and were seen as socially distant competitors for housing,
jobs, and services. Papuans stereotyped “New Guineans” negatively, por-
traying Highlanders in particular as violent and primitive and regarding
themselves as peaceful and civilized in contrast (cf, Chatterton 1975, 284;
McKillop 1982, 334). In turn the Highlanders stereotyped Papuans as
lazy, and regarded themselves as enterprising and industrious. Papuan
stereotyping of “New Guineans” (generally a synecdoche for High-
landers) extended to seeing them as land-grabbers and their settlements
as less legitimate than those of Papuan migrants. In the 1970s the distinc-
tion between settlements inhabited by “Papuans” and those inhabited by
“New Guineans” developed political significance, particularly in the
campaigns of the Papuan separatist movement, Papua Besena, headed by
Josephine Abaijah, the first indigenous woman in parliament. Realizing
the importance of campaigning in settlements as well as in villages (Abai-
jah 1991, 188–194; Premdas and Steeves 1983, 54), Abaijah exploited the
regional stereotypes to advantage, particularly in the 1977 elections, and
an analysis of results showed overwhelming support for her in the Papuan-
dominated settlements (Premdas and Steeves 1983, 40, 55, 59).
Regional distinctions continue to be an issue in urban Papua New Gui-
nea, and tensions manifest themselves in occasional violent confronta-
tions. In formal housing estates micro-ethnic enclaves rarely develop, as
individual migrant families move into houses, or are assigned them by
employers, where and when they become available around the towns. In
contrast, self-help areas and other informal habitats are typified either by
single micro-ethnic populations, such as those from the Gulf region in the
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older settlements in Port Moresby, or by groups from several regions who
a rrange themselves territorially on the land available for building. The sec-
ond type of group is found mostly in those self-help areas established since
the 1960s, and mutual distrust can result in simmering tension and the
possibility of hostilities. At the end of the colonial era, occasional noisy
confrontations in some self-help communities, and the resulting police
i n t e rvention, fueled popular European views of settlements as sites of tro u-
ble, even though the altercations rarely spread beyond the immediate habi-
tats in which they occurred, and were—and still are—exacerbated rather
by friction over shared space and re s o u rces than by extreme povert y, squa-
lor, or criminal proclivities. Among the self-help settlements themselves,
those dominated by Papuans are to the present day quick to differentiate
between their own allegedly peaceful habitats and those they re g a rd as giv-
ing settlements a bad reputation (Goddard 1998)—and which they stere o-
type, often inaccurately, as Highlander-dominated.
The incorporation of settlements into regional antagonisms in the late
colonial era meant that among Papua New Guineans they were classified
according to the regional identities of their inhabitants instead of being
negatively distinguished from other indigenous habitats. In addition, the
prevalence of the wantok system in the indigenization of Port Moresby
and other urban centers from the late 1970s meant that kinship ties tran-
scended different types of habitat. People living in high-covenant housing
estates usually had kin living in settlements, and visits between relatives
consolidated the social proximity of the variety of urban habitats. Con-
ceivably, these developments contained the potential to effect a replace-
ment of the European concept of “squatter settlements” with an alterna-
tive classification of urban habitats reflecting the indigenous social reality
of wantokism and ethnic and regional divisions. Yet the popular colonial
imagery of squatter settlements survived and in the 1990s continued to
pervade journalistic portraits of the independent nation. For example, in
a popular book on contemporary Papua New Guinea a veteran journal-
ist gives an account of several pages that juxtaposes urban crime, poverty,
and “settlements” (Dorney 1993, 299–309). The suburb of Morata is
referred to, inaccurately, as “one of the largest and longest established”
squatter settlements in Port Moresby (1993, 303). The author expresses
no judgmental view, and the discussion acknowledges that “squatter set-
tlements” are victimized by police and that settlers resent being labeled
thieves (1993, 302). Despite Dorney’s neutrality, however, the account’s
reliance on an influential sociological paper on criminal gangs (Harris
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1988) and anecdotal evidence from a former police chief about raids on
settlements (1993, 303) results in their being discursively positioned as
criminogenic habitats.
Far from disappearing with the end of European political domination,
the negative condensation of migration, povert y, and crime in the image of
settlements had by the 1990s become conventionalized to the point where
it was also being taken for granted in some academic literature. For exam-
ple, the substance of contemporary introductory courses on Papua New
Guinea history at the University of Papua New Guinea was reproduced
in a 1993 publication (by a prominent Papua New Guinean academic)
which deployed the ideation of “settlements” with efficient brevity under
the subheading “Law and Order”: “As village society broke down more
and more, villagers moved to the urban areas in the hope of employment
and greater access to Western goods. As there was no housing for most
of these people, they built shanties out of any available materials and cre-
ated squatter settlements. As there was very often no employment for
them, many turned to crime” (Waiko 1993, 217).
Importantly, the perpetuation of the imagery of squatter settlements
into the 198 0s involved a polemical addition to the meanings it contained,
based on a popular Papua New Guinean dichotomization (in PNG Eng-
lish) of the country’s population into grassroots and elites.8 This devel-
opment was prefigured by the previously mentioned resentment at segre-
gation enforced by a European elite, articulated for example by Kiki in
his remarks about Papua New Guineans being consigned to “settlements”
(1966, 72). Stereotyping indigenous elites as rich, greedy, self-serving, and
a p p ropriating the economic standing and housing of departing Euro p e a n s ,
rural and urban g r a s s roots p o s i t i o n ed themselves discursively as the under-
class, the unrewarded backbone of the country. In towns the term settle-
ments symbolized their putative living conditions and frustrations, but
also served hyperbolically to symbolize the habitat of the “real” people
of urban Papua New Guinea.9 Given the overall socioeconomic complex-
ity of contemporary Papua New Guinea, including the high proportion of
self-defined “unemployed” who are actually engaged in informal eco-
nomic activities that often produce more income than conventional wage
work (Barber 1993; Levantis 1997), the elites–grassroots dichotomy is as
reductive and misleading as the popular colonial dichotomy that pre c e d e d
it (see M Tu rner 199 0, 68–7 6). However, the potential of the obverse, pos-
itive meaning added to those already existing in the simplistic imagery of
settlements appropriated from European usage cannot be overlooked.
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Recent Prime Minister Bill Skate used it to advantage in the 1997 e l e c-
tions, campaigning in the city as a “man of the people,” visiting settlement
communities, and achieving an unprecedented urban legitimacy partly by
emphasizing his upbringing in a “squatter settlement” in Port More s b y
and his understanding of g r a s s roots i s s u e s .1 0 The e l i t e s – g r a s s roots d i c h o t-
omy is also employed in the practiced rhetoric of so-called raskols ( To k-
pisin: “rascals,” street crime gangs) who like to promote themselves to
re s e a rchers as avengers of the poor against those in power (Morauta 198 6,
1 1; Goddard 199 2, 30; 1995, 58; Levantis 1997), and who are usually por-
trayed in the media as settlement dwellers. 
Arguably, the multivocality of the imagery of “squatter settlements”
contributes significantly to its resilience in contemporary times. In popu-
lar discourse it can “speak” of unemployment, poverty, crime, but also of
urban integrity and social injustice. Consequently, the generalized con-
cept of “settlements” can be brought into discursive play in different and
sometimes contrary contexts. In one, benignly, it connotes dispossession
as an inevitable burden of urbanization and economic rapacity, a discur-
sive theme of liberal commentators and welfare agencies urging charita-
ble attitudes toward a generalized category of penurious settlers (eg, Chao
1989). The publicity given the Salvation Army’s feeding program (PC, 15
July 1998) at the Baruni dump belongs to this discourse, as does the video
clip accompanying Bad Mix Souls’ song “Born to Suffer.” The song was
written to express the socioeconomic conditions the band members said
they shared with many other Papua New Guineans. Yet its production had
to negotiate some discongruity between the realities of informal housing
and the homogenizing notion of squatter settlements and attendant pov-
erty. The band members were residents of self-help settlements on Port
Moresby’s periphery (PC, 24 Nov 1998). The most pressing problems for
these settlements, like most others around the city since settlements began
to develop half a century ago, are not mass unemployment but the lack
of services like piped water, proper access roads, and sanitation. In order
to effectively illustrate the song’s theme of disparities between the rich
and the poor (born of the elites–grassroots dichotomy), the group used an
image not from their own settlements but from the well-publicized Baruni
dump, one of the few habitats in Port Moresby, out of all those referred
to as “squatter settlements,” that empirically fits the imagery of a truly
penurious urban community. An overlapping discursive context in which
the concept of squatter settlements is employed is that of the integrity of
grassroots, the downtrodden toilers of the new nation. The former prime
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minister’s self-legitimating references to his settlement upbringing belong
in this context, and his urban reputation as an advocate of grassroots is
maintained by acts like his arrival to give handouts and verbal comfort to
the squatters evicted from the old parliament building. 
T he most powerf ul discourse, however, since it legitimates the occa-
s i o n al d e s t ru c t i on of “squatter settlements” r a n g i ng f rom dump s c a v e n g e r s
to self-help housing areas, is that which collapses together unemployment,
poverty, and crime. However, in contemporary Papua New Guinea, pop-
ular media images and politicians’ rhetoric of criminal-infested settlements
are no more supported by careful research than they were in earlier
decades. The National Vice-President of the Papua New Guinea Social
Wo r k e rs Association commented in1994, “ P o rt M o re s by re s i d e n ts a re w e ll
aware that criminals operate from suburban areas like Hohola, Gerehu
or Boroko . . . which are certainly not settlements” (Wrondimi 1994, 4).
He added, “Mass eviction is definitely not a solution to resolve criminal
activities in urban centres; since such activities are also perpetrated . . . by
white collar workers who hold high positions and live in high covenant,
tight-security residences. . . . Recent discussions with settlers in Rabaul
and Lae indicate that the majority of them, in fear of losing their tempo-
rary residence on the land, are not involved in criminal activities” (Wron-
dimi 1994, 18).
Research in Port Moresby in the early 1990s also indicated that mem-
bers of so-called raskol gangs came from a variety of socioeconomic back-
g rounds and could not be generalized as the products only of squatter set-
tlements ( G o d d a rd 1992, 1995). More o v e r, its findings did not support the
generalization that unemployment “causes” crime. Interviews with gang
members in 1991 revealed that many found crime more lucrative than
waged work, and had either left formal employment for crime or supple-
mented their legitimate income with it. Some, enticed into raskolism at
s c h o ol a g e, h ad n e v er s e r i o u s ly c o n s i d e red f o rm al e m p l o y m e n t. O v e r a l l, t h e
i n t e rview material suggested that the conditioning relationship between
unemployment and raskolism may well be the reverse of what is popu-
larly thought (Goddard 1992, 21). Questionnaire research by Levantis in
1995 appears to support my findings, with self-defined r a s k o l s, of whom a
high pro p o rtion were not seeking formal wage work, indicating that crime
pays better than (at least) average wage work (Levantis 1997).
Successive governments in independent Papua New Guinea have been
dogged by the publicity given to the country ’s crime problem, and to urban
crime in particular. A series of commissioned reports, reaching its zenith
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in the massive “Clifford Report” (Clifford, Morauta, and Stuart 1984),
has revealed the overwhelming complexity of the issue and produced no
simple solutions. As Dinnen stated, “The impression is one of escalating
lawlessness, on the one hand, and a progressively ineffectual crime con-
trol system, on the other” (1992, 1). The measures mooted have included
states of emergency and curfews (both of which have been implemented
for short periods) as well as vagrancy laws, identity cards, and more dra-
conian punishment of offenders. Nothing has provided a satisfactory solu-
tion, and politically expedient state responses to crime have “increasingly
entailed bypassing the normal processes of criminal justice in favour of
more visible and direct exercises of state power” (Dinnen 1992, 3). Given
that criminological applications of global theories of modernization or
dependency assume crime—and especially “street” crime—to be a prod-
uct of urbanization and rapid social change (Dinnen 1992, 17–18; God-
d a rd 1995, 56–57), it is not surprising that public displays of crime contro l
are directed at those constituencies most easily portrayed as the default-
ers in the urbanization process. Unemployed, undereducated migrants are
blamed for crime, and the imagery of squatter settlements is brought into
play as politicians and police seek a social site that collectivizes such peo-
ple for the purposes of displays of crime-fighting efficiency.
Although “squatter settlements” provide a handy focus for political
rhetoric and dramatic images of efficient crime fighting (press reporters
were present at the parliament-house and Baruni-dump evictions and are
given police publicity statements after some planned raids on settlements),
the alternative discursive contexts of “settlements” weaken the potential
of a sustained campaign against informal housing. Both the Rolling Thun-
der and Enough is Enough raids were publicized as the beginning of a sus-
tained program of settlement evictions (as the image of rolling thunder
suggests) that did not eventuate. Most residents of Port Moresby, includ-
ing the elites, a re migrants or, in the case of a younger generation, the chil-
d ren of migrants. And most, if they do not live in informal housing, have
wantoks who do. Given the currency of the elites–grassroots imagery, the
c rosscutting social ties, and the discontinuity between the realities of infor-
mal housing and the homogenizing notion of “settlements” it is possible
for people to vacillate between benign and censorious settlement imagery.
A surge in street crime or a threat to business interests from international
media focusing on the nation’s law-and-order problems can trigger censo-
rious polemic against squatter settlements. Conversely, corruption in high
places and chronic rough handling of ord i n a ry people by the police trig-
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gers the rhetoric that g r a s s roots a re dispossessed and unfairly consigned
to life in settlements. Eviction programs cannot be sustained for any length
of time in the face of such ambiguity. On a wave of frustration and anger
in some sections of the general urban community early in 1998, two small
and vulnerable communities of squatters, unable to legitimate their pres-
ence through any appeal to customary or other land-use arrangements,
were easily routed. But Rolling Thunder was a fanciful metaphor. A con-
tinued program of evictions and destruction of “settlements” would mean
engagement with a much wider range of informal housing, with a signif-
icant proportion and socioeconomic range of the urban population, and
with the tortuous wantok networks linking the poor to the rich and the
powerless to the powerful, threatening the ideological notion of “squat-
ter settlements.”
Police raids on settlements and the occasional destruction of individual
settlements can be legitimated by appeals to the negative imagery of squat-
ter settlements, but in some cases the mobilizing of alternative imagery can
create the paradoxes evident in the case of the old-parliament-building
and Baruni-dump evictions. Thus the police satisfy the business elites and
demonstrate their efficient response to the law-and-order problem by dra-
matically evicting the parliament-building squatters, and a prime minis-
ter satisfies the grassroots and demonstrates his populism by commiser-
ating and giving them food handouts. The Baruni-dump squatters can be
used at one moment to demonstrate police commitment to crime control,
at another to publicize social welfare initiatives, and at yet another to
illustrate a pop song about the division between rich and poor. The alter-
native imagery is equally bound, of course, to a homogenizing notion of
“squatter settlements” and would be as vulnerable as the criminal imagery
to exposure as falsification if practical interventionist responses were
extended beyond a handful of genuinely penurious habitats. 
C o n c l u s i o n
While the negative portrayal of urban settlement communities in Papua
New Guinea has much in common with a stereotype found in third-world
countries elsewhere, it cannot be explained simply by generalizing with-
out qualification from existing critiques of the hegemonic discourses used
to legitimate mistreatment of migrants in informal housing (eg, Dwyer
1979; Drakakis-Smith 1981; Scheper-Hughes 199 2). The discursive re p re-
sentation of settlements in Papua New Guinea must be understood in the
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context of its own unique history. To this end I have traced the homog-
enizing imagery of “squatter settlements” in Papua New Guinea, from its
origins in the imagination of late colonial Europeans, through its appro-
priation by Papua New Guineans after independence, to its prevalence in
contemporary times. 
This imagery did not in the late colonial period, and does not now,
accurately reflect the real diversity of urban housing, especially informal
housing. The imagery, which has gained additional meanings in indige-
nous usage, is employed in different discursive situations to connote dis-
possession, unemployment, and in its most censorious use, criminality—
the last being a practical threat to those who live in informal housing, as i t
is used to justify police raids and sometimes eviction. As researchers have
occasionally pointed out, “settlements” (“informal housing” is a better,
though still imperfect, descriptive term) are essentially a response to inad-
equate housing policies since the end of the Second World War and pro-
vide habitats for a wide socioeconomic range of people, as indeed do s e t-
tlements and slums in other parts of the world. An investigation in 199 4
in a Lae “squatter settlement,” for instance, revealed that about three-
quarters of the population was in some kind of employment (Kaitilla
1994, 646). Further, social research since the 1970s has not shown infor-
mal housing to be a greater breeding ground for criminals than other
types of housing (I am not, of course, suggesting that there are no crimi-
nals l i v i n g in i n f o rm al h o u s i n g ). The categorical d e m o n i z i ng of settlements,
partly sustained by the frequency of well-publicized police raids rather
than by their findings, is certainly undeserved.
Settlements are vulnerable not only to police raids but also to the crim-
inals they are alleged to harbor. There used to be a notable contrast
between the fort ress-like appearance of postindependence formal housing,
encased in high fencing and barbed or razor wire, and the absence of fort i-
fication in settlements. But in recent years high-security fencing has begun
to appear in some self-help settlements as householders attempt to pro t e c t
themselves against Port Moresby’s endemic burglaries and armed attacks.
During a vacation visit in 1998 I commented humorously to friends in a
self-help settlement that some of their neighbors’ houses looked as well
fortified as those of the elites. The conversation quickly became serious,
as people discussed the “ l a w - a n d - o rd e r ”p ro b l e m, t he rascal gangs, a nd t h e
police raids. Romantic portraits were painted of an idyllic life “at home”
in villages as now-familiar complaints were reiterated about the deterio-
rating quality of life in the city. “I am tired of the r a s k o l s, I am tired of
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the police, I am tired of trying to sleep with the sound of gunshots. I am
afraid for my children,” said Rani, a community worker, “I am trying to
persuade my husband to move to Eight Mile [ie, to one of the new self-
help settlements outside the city]. If not, I want to take the children and
go back to our ples [home village, place of origin].”
T h e re is no easy solution to crime in Papua New Guinea, and there is
c e rtainly no clearly definable criminal constituency for the state to engage
with. Wro n d i m i ’s (199 4, 4) comment that Port More s b y ’s residents are
well aware that criminals operate from suburban areas other than settle-
ments (with which, as a former resident, I concur) raises the question of
whether the censorious diatribes about settlements, the frequent police
raids, and the sporadic evictions of the most vulnerable of squatters serv e
a wider purpose than a show of governmental and police competence in
the struggle to achieve law and ord e r. Given the systemic and insoluble
p resence of crime throughout urban society, and the frustration of the
public as a whole, it is tempting to perceive settlements as scapegoats in
the strict sense of that term, in that an innocent party is ritually designated
the bearer of the sins of the community as a whole and consigned to an
extra-civic fate. Sadly, in the absence of improvements in urban housing
p rograms, and with no indication of a significant abatement of r a s k o l i s m
in the short term, good citizens in informal housing are likely to continue
to be the victims of the cyclopean responses of urban authorities.
* * *
This paper is pa rt ly informed by acquaintance, over a number of years,
with various people living in informal housing in Port Moresby. Their individual
stories are not told here, and they should remain anonymous, but I was partly
motivated to write this piece by concern for the uncertainties with which they are
obliged to live. I am indebted to them for whatever understanding I may have of
their situation. I benefited from discussions with Barry Morris and Keith Barber
at an early stage in this paper’s production, and from comments by anonymous
reviewers. The interpretations and conclusions are my own.
Notes
1 It is questionable whether the images used in these journalistic portraits are
based on detailed local observation. They are commonly found in characteriza-
tions of “typical” third-world shantytowns (see, eg, Dwyer 1979, 45; Yeung and
Belisle 1986, 100).
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2 An ethnography by Alan Rew, who did participant observation fieldwork
in a company compound in Port Moresby in the 1960s, and a discussion by Rich-
ard and Mary Salisbury, also based on participant observation during the 1960s,
give a good indication of the complex relationship between employment and
habitat during this period (Rew 1974, Salisbury and Salisbury 1972).
3 For example Oram, drawing on his own findings and those of government
reports, listed in one publication the number of settlements as 14 in 1950, 18 in
1964, and 40 in 1970 (Oram 1976b, 152). Two maps in the same article showed
25 and 31 settlements respectively (1976b, 154, 167). A loose map with the same
volume showed 31 settlements, but not all in the same locations as on the second
map in Oram’s article. An article by Jackson in the same volume gave the num-
ber of settlements in 1976 as “over 40” (Jackson 1976, 63). Oram repeated his
statistics (with the first date as 1956 instead of 195 0) in his book on Port More s b y,
in which a map showed only 27 settlements in 1974 (1976a, 99, 176). Groves,
Hamilton, and McArthur (1971, 281) cited a list compiled by the “Sub-District
O ff i c e” identifying 2 2 “squatter shanty settlements” in about 196 4. A map in Rew
(1974, 14) showed only 19 settlements in 1969 (the time of his fieldwork).
4 A household survey by King in 1987 a c ross all housing types, while arg u a b l y
committing the conceptual error Barber avoided, found an “average” household
of seven (husband, wife, three children, two other relatives), against the popular
belief that indigenous urban households were inundated with wantoks (King
199 2 , 6). It should be acknowledged, of course, that “overc rowding” is a term in
need of qualification in respect of differing cultural conceptions of the relation-
ship between numbers of people and adequate domestic resources.
5 The name refers to the distance from downtown Port Moresby. Since the
colonial period, locations along the Hubert Murray Highway from downtown
Port Moresby to the airport and beyond have been referred to locally by this
method. Thus Two Mile, Three Mile, Four Mile, and so on are alternatives to
more conventional names found on formal maps, and in several cases are more
familiar to city residents. It remains to be seen whether the new Poreporena
Highway linking the downtown area to Gordons by a shorter route has an effect
on these informal mapping idioms.  
6 Similar concerns were felt on the other side of the country by landholders
in Lae. See Adams (1982) for an account of local responses to perceived land loss
and settlement growth.
7 New Guinea refers to the northern half of the nation, a residual distinction
from the colonial era. While the highlands topographically straddled the colonial
dividing line between Papua and New Guinea, coastal and lowland Papuans tend
to classify all Highlanders as New Guineans.
8 In PNG English the plural elites refers to members of a putative socioeco-
nomic group that Europeans would call (collectively) “the elite.” PNG English
thus allows for the singular case, whereby an individual can be referred to as “an
elite.” Similarly there is a class of grassroots and an individual can be referred to
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as a “grassroot.” These terms have also been taken into (urban, mostly) Tokpi-
sin.
9 In the 1980s a cartoon character called Grass Roots, developed by the Post-
Courier n e w s p a p e r’s cartoonist Bob Browne, enjoyed enormous popularity. Grass
Roots was a trickster whose income came from dubious activities like black mar-
keteering. It was not made clear exactly where he lived, but the popular infer-
ence was a Port Moresby settlement, probably Six Mile.
10 Bill Skate grew up in Sabama settlement, which was first established in the
1950s on customary land adjacent to, and owned by, the Koita urban village of
Kila Kila, near the suburb of Badili in Port Moresby (Norwood 1984, 49). 
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Abstract
As Papua New Guinea’s well-publicized “law and order” problem continues
unabated, calls are often made for the destruction of squatter settlements and the
dispersal of their inhabitants as a solution to urban crime. This article examines
the popular imagery of urban “squatter settlements” in Papua New Guinea,
which represents them as criminogenic habitats of unemployed and impover-
ished migrants. The imagery is generally as misleading as that of squatter and
shanty environments elsewhere in the third world—a topic that is familiar in
critical academic literature. But it is argued here that the shared imagery cannot
be submitted to an analysis that simply draws on political-economic generaliza-
tions about housing and marginalization in “developing” nations. The notion of
squatter settlements in the independent nation of Papua New Guinea has a spe-
cific origin in the imagination and attitudes of Europeans in the preceding colo-
nial period. The historical transformations through which the imagery has been
perpetuated are examined to understand how present-day urban Papua New
Guineans can continue to demonize settlements in the face of lived experience
that contradicts this censorious discourse. 
k e y words: crime, housing, poverty, squatter settlements, urbanization.
